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THE CUSTODY DECISION PROCESS:
TOWARD NEW ROLES FOR PARENTS AND THE STATE
PATRICIA H. MARSCHALL* AND MARGARET J. GATZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
A parental agreement on custody controls the fate of children in a
vast majority of divorce cases. Legal scholars, however, have generally
ignored this parental decision-making process. Instead they have fo-
cused solely on the judicial custody decision, with primary emphasis on
a search for proper criteria. There has been only an occasional glance at
parental decision-making and the role of the participants. This article
will attempt to shed light on the low-visibility parental custody decision-
making process. Utilizing the results of a questionnaire sent to a repre-
sentative group of divorced parents who settled custody by agreement,
the article will describe and evaluate the weights attached by parents to
various criteria traditionally considered by courts in making custody
decisions. It will also examine the desirability of extending the scope of
parental responsibility for custody decisions by requiring mediation of
parental disputes before adjudication will be allowed.
II. THE RIGHT OF PARENTS To DECIDE THE CUSTODY ISSUE
If parents can agree on custody, the state does not interfere. Although
most state statutes vest the divorce court with the duty and power to
make a custody determination that will promote the best interests of the
child, in practice courts accept parental agreements without question. If
they attempted to do otherwise, it is possible that such interference with
intimate family relationships would run afoul of the Constitution.' How-
ever, one Supreme Court case strongly suggests that the state has
virtually unlimited power to set aside a parental custody decision. In
Ford v. Ford2 the Court held that a Virginia judgment dismissing a
* B.A., University of Texas, 1953; J.D., University of Texas Law School, 1955;
LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1968. Professor of Law, North Carolina Central Univer-
sity School of Law.
** B.A., Southwestern at Memphis, 1966; Ph.D., Duke University, 1972. Assistant
Professor of Psychology, University of Maryland.
1. The Supreme Court has frequently recognized the existence of a "private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter," Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944). See also, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). This decision-making
power residing in the family can, of course, be overcome in the event it is seriously mis-
used. Every state has a procedure to terminate the parental rights of a parent deter-
mined to be unfit.
2. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
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custody suit based upon an out of court settlement between parents did
not have to be accorded full faith and credit by other states because it
had no res judicata effect in Virginia. Although technically just a
decision on Virgnia law the Supreme Court noted approvingly that
under that state's law:
The parents cannot make agreements which will bind courts to decide
a custody case one way or the other.'
The Ford opinion appears to represent a determination that the state has
unlimited power to overturn parental custody decisions to prevent a
child's best interests from being bargained away and that no deference
need be paid to the parents' wishes. But it is difficult to reconcile some
of the Court's broad language in Ford with other decisions upholding
parental rights to make basic decisions about a child's upbringing,
education and religious training such as Meyer v. Nebraska,' Pierce v
Society of Sisters' and Wisconsin v. Yoder.6 In Pierce, the state argued
that children's best interests were served by requiring them to attend
public schools. However, the Court concluded:
. . . [the compulsory public school attendance law] unreasonably in-
terferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the up-
bringing and education of children under their control. 7
Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder all recognize a parent's interest in guiding
the upbringing and education of a child to be a form of liberty protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8
3. Id. at 193.
4. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
5. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
6. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
7. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
8. The fact that the parental interest is protected by the liberty clause of the four-
teenth amendment does not mean that parental decision on a child's upbringing may
never be overridden by the state. Generally, restrictions on a protected liberty are per-
missible when the state's interest is compelling and legitimate. In Pierce, the Court ap-
parently determined that the state's interest in requiring public school attendance was
not legitimate because it could not legitimately seek "to standardize its children by forc-
ing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." 268 U.S. 510, 535. The
Court further determined that other conceivable state interests at stake were not com-
pelling, noting:
[sic] And there are no peculiar circumstances or present emergencies which demand
measures relative to primary education.
Id. at 534. Pierce itself implicitly recognized that a parental decision that children not
attend any school could be overridden by the state. 268 U.S. 510, 534; Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33. Both Pierce and other cases have recognized that a paren-
tal decision on a child's upbringing may be overridden when the state's interest is suffi-
ciently important. Pierce and Meyer v. Nebraska suggest the state's interest must be
legitimate and compelling, 268 U.S. 510, 534; 262 U.S. 390, 401-403 while some other
cases appear to apply only the rational relationship test. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158.
However, the Court's approach in Ford appears different from either of these: it ap-
pears to view the state's power on the custody question as absolute and does not recog-
nize that any fourteenth amendment liberty may be at issue.
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Conceivably, Ford v. Ford can be reconciled with these cases on the
theory that only the ongoing family has a protected liberty to be free
from state interference with its decisions about children's upbringing
and education. The Court's opinion in Ford did emphasize the danger of
parental custody decisions where:
The estrangement of husband and wife beclouds parental judgment
with emotion and prejudice. 9
Although this narrow reading of Ford may adequately distinguish it
from Meyer, Pierce and Yoder, it is arguable that the state should have
no greater power to override parental decisions because a family is in
dissolution. If one accepts Margaret Mead's notion that biological par-
ents should be considered co-parents for life, regardless of divorce, 10
then their relationship for the purpose of raising children should be
accorded the same protections given spouses in an on-going marriage.
As a practical matter, parental custody decisions will be supported by
courts so long as no family member protests. The litigation in Ford v.
Ford arose only when a mother changed her mind and chose to chal-
lenge her ex-husband's custody of their three children.
HI. A DESCRIPTION OF PARENTAL CUSTODY DECISION MAKING
A. Description of Survey Procedures and Brief Statement of Results
To gather facts which would be helpful in evaluating the parental
custody decision-making process, the authors (with the cooperation of
the national Parents Without Partners organization) sent a question-
naire to a representative sample of divorced parents who had settled
custody by agreement. In addition to some basic identifying data, the
parents were questioned about the weight they had accorded each of
fifteen traditional custody criteria (listed in Table 1); whether each
criterion was considered because of parental insight, or because of input
from an attorney or a mental health professional; whether short-run or
long-term considerations were emphasized; and whether in retrospect
they felt differently about the relative importance of the various criteria.
In order to ascertain the basic dimensions considered by these parents
in making their custody decisions, we examined which sets of items were
generally rated similarly by any given parent, using the technique of
factor analysis of the ratings of the fifteen criteria." Five factors
emerged, such that a parent who thought that one item in a factor was
important usually also believed that all items encompassed by that factor
9. 371 U.S. 187, 193.
10. See MARGARET MEAD AND RHODA METRAUX, A WAY OF SEEING 199-200 (1970).
11. Additional information on the survey and data analysis is contained in Appen-
dix A.
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were important. These five basic underlying dimensions, listed in order
of weight accorded them by survey parents, were:
1. A family structure factor, emphasizing keeping the child in the
same familiar custodial environment, maintaining the family unit, and
keeping the children together;
2. A maternal factor, which indicates that young children absolutely
should be with their mother;
3. A child-oriented social-emotional factor, emphasizing that a child
should be with the parent with whom he has the closest relationship, the
importance of the child's preference, the need of older children for the
parent of the same sex, and the importance of having a parent at home
during the day;
4. A moral factor, weighted with the importance of continuing a
child's religious training, the parent's morals, preference for a two-
parent home, and freedom from alcoholism; and
5. A caretaker factor, pertaining to the parent's physical, mental and
financial ability to care for a child.
In addition, three individual items-freedom from past or present
serious mental illness, alcoholism, and low morals (items 6,8, and 11 in
Table l)-were considered by parents as minimally necessary criteria.
In other words, a parent with problems in any of these three areas was
deemed to be unfit as a custodian despite other factors in his or her
favor; but if there were no serious problems in these areas, the items
receded in importance, as indicated by the five factors.
Not all parents rated the factors identically. Fathers who had obtained
custody of some or all of their children rated the family structure factor
as most important, but, unlike mother-custodians, they rated the child-
oriented social-emotional factor as second. Parents responding to the
questionnaire who did not have custody rated the caretaking and the
family structure factors less highly than did parents who had custody.
The basic conclusion from our study is that the scope of parental
responsibility for deciding custody should be extended. Before arriving
at this decision we evaluated the factors used by parents in deciding
custody and the weight they accorded each factor. A detailed description
of this evaluation follows.
B. The Family Structure Factor
As previously indicated, survey parents attached the most signficance
to the family structure factor-keeping the child in the same familiar
custodial environment, keeping the children together, and placing the
child in a family unit which appears to have permanence. Was this
reasonable?
4
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Given the fact that divorce itself is disruptive to the child, it would
seem wise to minimize other changes as much as possible. Attaching the
greatest weight to the stability factor, however, creates the possibility
that the child may be separated from the parent with whom he has the
closest relationship. This may be more disruptive to the child than a
change in his physical environment and/or separation from the less
close parent and siblings. The results of discontinuity in care vary
according to the stage of childhood development at the time of the
disruption,12 but in general both continuity of activities and the reassur-
ance of the love of both parents are important to any child.'
C. The Maternal Factor
Preference for the mother as custodian was rated by parents as the
second most important factor. Although the wisdom of emphasizing this
factor is questionable, the fact that parents did so is not surprising. In
our society it traditionally has been assumed that the mother is the one
who fills the nurturing role and is therefore closest to the children.' 4
Thus, stressing the maternal preference as important may in some cases
be a shorthand rendition of the child-oriented social-emotional factor.
For young children, there is evidence that any separation from the
mother may have profound effects.' Consistent mothering is necessary
for the child to learn "basic trust," which is prerequisite to the ability to
form relationships of trust in the future.' This mothering role, although
traditionally filled by the biological mother, may, of course, also be filed
by the father or by another adult if the parents are unavailable.
It should be noted that several survey respondents commented that
the material preference factor was crucial in their decision-making
because they understand that under existing state law "mothers always
get custody of young children." The extent to which this perceived legal
bias may have been responsible for the importance accorded to the
maternal preference by other respondents is unclear. Undoubtedly some
of the respondents who gave heavy weight to a maternal preference
simply believe that children belong with mothers as a matter of natural
law.
Interestingly, out of eight survey parents who reported a change in
custody after the initial decision, seven involved changing the custody
12. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREuD, ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTER-
ESTS OF THE CHILD, 32-35 (1973); Bradbrook, The Relevance of Psychological and Psy-
chiatric Studies to the Future Development of the Laws Governing the Settlement of
Inter-Parental Custody Disputes, 11 J. FAM. LAW 557, 575-76 (1971).
13. J. LOUISE DESPERT, CHILDREN OF DIVORCE, 30-31, 67 (1953).
14. Bradbrook, supra note 12 at 662-63.
15. CHRISTOPH M. HEINICKE AND ILSE J. WESTHEIMER, BRIEF SEPARATIONS (1965).
16. ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247-251 (1963).
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from the mother to the father. Also several survey parents indicated that
in the light of hindsight they believed they accorded too much weight to
the maternal preference. These survey results suggest that the general
societal expectation that the mother will assume custody may blind
couples to the realities of their individual situations. As one survey
mother stated, "The issue of me not having the children was never
brought up."
At the time the maternal preference arose, it was generally assumed
that the mother would continue to stay at home and care for the
children. Today, it is likely that the single parent, male or female, will
have to assume a combination mother/father role. In many cases, by
virtue of being more securely established in a business or profession, the
father may be able to manage this dual role more easily. Fortunately,
there is a recent trend toward more participation by fathers in the
rearing of children. Practicing lawyers report a resulting upswing in the
number of fathers who request custody.
D. The Social-Emotional Factor
Survey parents ranked the child-oriented social-emotional factor as
third in importance, suggesting that a majority of parents may not be
educated to the importance of a child's psychological ties. During the
last decade writers have stressed the need to determine who is the
"psychological parent" to the child, i.e., who has the deepest relationship
of trust and affection with the child. 17 If only one of the parents is
properly classifiable as a "psychological parent," and the child is not
placed in his or her custody, the risk of serious psychological damage is
great.
Identifying the "psychological parent" is not easy because there is no
litmus paper test for determining the depth of a parent-child relation-
ship. Furthermore it is hard for a parent to perceive and admit that a
child is closer to the other parent.
Survey parents quite properly looked at the child's preference as a
significant indication of which relationship is more meaningful to the
child. In ideal circumstances it is probably true that an older child is the
best judge of the quality of the parent-child relationships involved;
however, it has been pointed out that children may select custodians for
the wrong reasons, such as attempting to reach the more withdrawn
parent by selecting him or her, or because of a fear of being punished
17. Goldstein, Freud, Solnit, supra note 12 at 17-20; Watson, The Children of
Armageddon; Problems of Custody following Divorce, 21 SYRA. L. REV. 55, 68-69
(1969); Note, The Alternatives to "Parent Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving
Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 160 (1963).
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for choosing the other parent.'8 Teenagers are especially prone to ma-
nipulate one parent against the other in a custody contest.19
It is often assumed that an older child should be placed with the
parent of the same sex for the purpose of providing a sex role model.
While this is important, other aspects of the parent-child relationship
should also be considered and may be even more important. Happily, the
use of behavioral experts by courts to assess parent-child relationships
tends to be increasing.20
E. The Moral Factor
The moral factor was ranked as fourth of the five factors in import-
ance. Adultery is often a component of the divorce situation, and, where
a party is involved with a third person, name-calling and accusations of
being an unfit parent are frequent. The recent judicial trend, however, is
away from punishing an adulterous parent by depriving him or her of
custody and toward an evaluation of whether the parental conduct had
an actual detrimental effect on the child.2 For example, psychological
harm might occur to the child if the adulterous activities cause excessive
absence from the home or if the child has knowledge of the conduct. 2
Preference for a two-parent home, which was part of the moral factor,
has considerable psychological evidence in its favor. Many problems in
sex-role identification have been traced to the absence of one or the
other parent. It "require[s] the stimulation of both parents for the
unfolding of all the complexities of the oedipal organization."23 Further,
as Goldstein, Freud and Solnit point out, "the child in a one-parent
home is deprived of the benefits of a relationship with two adults who
have an intimate relationship with each other." 4 It is, on the other
hand, a mistake to keep a bad marriage together for the sake of the
18. Note, 37 U. COL. L. REv. 420, 421-422 (1965).
19. G. Lindenbauer, Will Your Marriage Make or Break Your Child?, J. EMO-
TIONAL EDUCATION 8, 139-142 (1968).
20. Foster and Freed, Child Custody (Part II), 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 615, 616 (1964).
21. See Bergman, Custody Awards: Standards Used Where the Mother Has Been
Guilty of Adultery or Alcoholism, 2 FAM. L.Q. 384 (1968). A father's adultery is
rarely mentioned in appellate decisions, thus indicating the existence of an unfair double-
standard in regard to this criterion.
22. Id. at 403. However, the wisdom of attempting to concel a long-term affair
from an older child is questionable. A class of junior high school students, with whom
one of the authors discussed custody, suggested that parental dishonesty, or even lack
of candor, would destroy trust in the parent and thus be more detrimental than knowl-
edge of the affair. The young people, however, felt that promiscuity on the part of a
parent would be confusing to the child and should be avoided. In the case of a com-
pulsively promiscuous parent, the students felt that his or her activities should be con-
cealed from the child.
23. PETER B. NEwAuER, THE ONE-PAnEr CHILD AND HIs OEDIPAL DEVELOPMENT,
THE PSYCOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 15, 308 (1960).
24. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, supra note 12 at 16.
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children. "[A] clinical observer finds the same patterns of emotional
disturbance in children of parents who do not divorce, although they
have failed at marriage, as in children of divorced parents who have not
made their peace with divorce.' 25 Further, in some cases a one-parent
home may be easier for a child to cope with than adjusting to a new
step-parent.2 6 Thus, many circumstances may mitigate against placing
too much emphasis on the two-parent criterion.
F. The Caretaker Factor
Survey parents attached the least significance to the caretaker factor.
A parent's ability to provide material advantages for the child is correct-
ly perceived as relatively unimportant, especially in light of the availabil-
ity of child support. However, as has been mentioned, one minimal
necessary criterion emerged from the caretaker factor: absence of seri-
ous past or present mental illness of the custodial parent. In the few
survey families where this criterion was present, it assumed overriding
importance. The parents' reluctance to entrust the care of children to
one presently experiencing serious mental illness seems justified. As
Malmquist points out, "one of the factors in a psychotic parent that ap-
pears most damaging is the unpredictability which their chaotic emo-
tionality presents to the child."27 A caveat should be noted: accuracy in
diagnosis and prognosis of mental illness is difficult if not impossible, to
achieve.' Also it is questionable whether past serious mental illness
should be considered as disqualifying one for custodianship. Guidance
from qualified court personnel could help parents overcome unreal
fears about mental illness.
G. Effect of Hindsight on Parents' Views
Parents were asked at the end of the questionnaire whether, with
hindsight, they might evaluate any differently the importance of the
fifteen criteria for deciding custody. The majority responded that they
would not change their ratings. However, the child's preference was
mentioned by several as more important than they originally deemed it.
The criterion most frequently downrated with the benefit of hindsight
was "parents' morals", followed by "young children should be with
mother." These changes mentioned by the survey parents are consistent
with the critique of parental criteria presented above.
25. Despert, supra note 13 at 23-24.
26. See Note, Divided Custody of Children After Their Parents' Divorce, 8 J. FAM.
L. 58, 61 (1968).
27. Malmquist, The Role of Parental Mental Illness in Custody Proceedings, 2
FAM. L.Q. 360, 374 (1968).
28. See generally THOMAS S. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1974).
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H. Short-term vs. Long-term Considerations
The survey parents were asked whether in deciding custody they
concentrated on short-run considerations or whether they attempted to
predict the long-term best interest of the children. A substantial majority
responded that they tried to predict long-run best interest. This is not
surprising, in light of the fact that the family structure factor, emphasiz-
ing stability of the child's environment was chosen as the most crucial
factor in custody decisions.
If feasible, taking the long view would be the better approach.
However, it is doubtful whether parental long-range predictions are
accurate. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit state that:
No one-and psychoanalysis created no exception-can forecast just
what experiences, what events, what changes a child, or for that mat-
ter his adult custodian, will actually encounter. Nor can anyone pre-
dict in detail how the unfolding development of a child and his family
will be reflected in the long run in the child's personality and charac-
ter formation. Thus the law will not act in the child's interests but
merely add to the uncertainties if it tries to do the impossible-guess
the future and impose on the custodian special conditions for the
child's care. .... In the long run, the child's chances will be better
if the law is less pretentious and ambitious in its aim, that is, if it con-
fines itself to the avoidance of harm and acts in accord with a few,
even if modest, generally applicable short-term predictions. 29
This advice, although directed toward the courts, seems equally applica-
ble to parental custody decision-making.
I. In-put from Attorneys & Mental Health Professionals
With reference to each criterion mentioned in the survey, parents
were asked to indicate whether its consideration had been suggested by a
lawyer and/or a mental health professional. Seventy-one percent of the
survey respondents reported no input from either their attorney or a
mental health professional concerning the criteria on which they should
base their custody decision. To the extent that there was professional
input, mental health professionals suggested four criteria, (mental ill-
ness, same familiar custodial environment, parents' morals, keeping
children together), and lawyers suggested three (same familiar custodial
environment, young children should be with mother, and an additional
criterion which four fathers wrote in, "fathers cannot be awarded cus-
tody under present-day court practices").
The fact that only thirteen percent of the survey parents received any
help from their attorney in deciding custody between themselves sug-
29. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, supra note 12 at 51-2.
9
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gests an almost total abdication by attorneys of their counseling role in
this sensitive and crucial area. While the development of the court-
attached custody mediator, discussed at length in a subsequent section of
this article, would provide help for those parents who find it difficult to
agree on custody, it seems that an important additional remedy would be
to increase emphasis on counseling in the law school curriculum and in
continuing legal education.
J. Conclusions
Parents involved in making custody decisions confront several prob-
lems. Not only are parents adversely affected by a lack of input from
attorneys and mental health professionals concerning the needs of chil-
dren, they also are hampered by outmoded rules of thumb such as the
preference favoring the mother as custodian for children of tender years.
In addition, parents must make the custody decision during a period of
stress. Despite these problems, parents have established generally rea-
sonable criteria for making the custody decision.
IV. A COMPARISON OF PARENTAL CUSTODY DECISION MAKING
AND JUDICIAL CUSTODY DECISION MAKING
A. Criteria
The survey results indicate that parents differ little from the courts in
the weights atttached to the various criteria involved in custody decision-
making. 0 Freedom from alcoholism or serious mental illness is regarded
as a minimally necessary criterion by both parents3 and courts. 2
Parents probably put more emphasis on the family structure factor
than do the courts. However, courts often have endeavored to keep
siblings together. 33 Likewise courts have stressed the need for continuity
of custodial care and stability in the custodial environment.34
30. Unfortunately, no studies exist concerning the weights attached by trial courts
to the various criteria. Our conclusions are based on reading appellate opinions and on
one author's eight years of practice in the field of domestic relations.
31. See Section III(A) supra.
32. E.g., Colonbo v. Colonbo, 71 Cal. App. 2d 577, 162 P.2d 995, Cal. Rptr.
(1945) (custody denied parent who suffered frequent hospitalizations for mental ill-
ness); Usery v. Usery, 229 Ore. 196, 367 P.2d 449 (1961) (custody denied to mother
who admitted frequent drinking.).
33. Baker v. Baker, 475 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
34. All of the cases found which stress continuity involve requests for modification
of custody. E.g., Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 220 So. 2d 438 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969), cert.
denied, 229 So. 2d 869 (1969); Matter of Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d 371 (1967); Chap-
sky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 40 Am. Rep. 321 (1881). However, continuity of care could
be a factor in the original custody decision if the parents had been separated for any
length of time and the children primarily had been in the actual custody of one parent.
Continuity in environment could be important to the initial decision if one parent
10
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It seems that parents currently are granting even more weight to the
maternal factor than are courts. Both legislatures and courts have begun
to question the wisdom of a strong maternal preference. In response to a
call for equal treatment of parents, several legislatures have passed
statutes indicating that the court shall not prefer one parent over the
other on the basis of sex.35 Some courts, even without legislative prod-
ding, are moving toward a more egalitarian view. Recent cases reflect
that a father's chance of getting custody is increasing.88 As previously
noted, a partial explanation for the great weight attached to the maternal
factor by survey parents lies in laymen's misconceptions about the
existence or the strength of the maternal preference in their jurisdic-
tions.3 7 As knowledge of legislative and judicial deemphasis of this
factor spreads, parents can be expected to accord it less weight.
Both courts and parents have accorded moderate weight to the child-
oriented social-emotional factor. The most important individual criter-
ion included in this factor is placing the child with the parent to whom
he feels closest. This involves a difficult judgment, but it is one that must
be made if the court is to protect the psychological welfare of the
child.38
Courts, like parents, frequently have attempted to determine which
parent will meet the older child's social and emotional needs by asking
him who he would prefer as his custodian. 39 Furthermore, both parents
planned to move, thus forcing the child to make new friends and attend a new school
while trying to cope with the other stresses engendered by the divorce.
Continuity of care is stressed as a crucial factor in the Michigan Child Custody Act
of 1970 which requires clear and convincing evidence that a change is in the child's best
interest before entering a new order or modification order overturning an established
custodial environment. Mich. C.L.A. 722.27 (Supp. 1975-1976).
35. E.g., § 247.24(3) Wisc. STAT. ANN. (1971); § 61.13(2) FLA. STAT. ANN.
(1971).
36. Podell, Peck and First, Custody-To Which Parent?, 56 MARQ. L. REv. 51, 54-6
(1972).
37. See Section II(C) supra.
38. Bradbrook, The Role of Judicial Discretion in Child Custody Adjudication in
Ontario, 21 U. TORONTO L.J. 402, 403-04 (1971). Depth of the parent-child relation-
ship was crucial in Hammett v. Hammett, 239 So. 2d 778 (Ct. Civ. App. Ala. 1970).
The mother had been given custody of three children aged 11 through 14. The retired
father had been staying at home with the children and caring for them. The appellate
court reversed, noting the children were more dependent on the father and wanted to
be with him.
39. Attaching weight to an older child's preference is sometimes a common law
rule, e.g., Elmore v. Elmore, 4 N.C. App. 192, 166 S.E.2d 506 (1969), and sometimes
a statutory mandate, Trr. 31, § 571-46(3) HAwArI REV. STAT. (1970). In Ohio, a child
fourteen or over has an absolute right to select his custodian provided that parent is fit.
§ 3109.04 Omo REv. CODE ANN. (1972). Although it is helpful for the judge to know
the child's views, it may be harmful to force the child to choose between his parents.
"Since all children have many mixed feelings about their parents, to place the burden
of choosing upon them is to lead them into deeper difficulty with their uncertainty and
ambivalence." Watson, Book Review, 43 -U. CINN. L. Rav. 455 (1974).
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and courts frequently indicate an awareness of the teenagers need for a
same-sexed parental role model.40
In conclusion, it appears that parents and courts tend to attach similar
weights to the various criteria involved in the custody decision. Both
need to place more emphasis on the child-oriented social-emotional
factor, and both undoubtedly have been deterred from doing so by the
judgmental difficulties involved.
B. Process
The process of parental custody decision making is clearly less harm-
ful to children than the judicial process. First, although the parents are
divorcing, their ability to work out a suitable custody arrangement for
their children will assure the children of a continuing "co-parenthood,"
by demonstrating to the child that both parents care about him and that
they are capable of planning together for his future. The sense of
helplessness that children experience in the face of divorce can only be
exacerbated by the parents' inability to solve the custody problem.
Furthermore, if the child is old enough to testify, subjecting him to a
formal courtoom procedure in which he is asked to state, either in open
court or in chambers, which parent he prefers as custodian, may be
quite traumatic. We therefore suggest that the state, rather than usurp-
ing a parental function, should facilitate parental negoitation by taking
on a mediator role and offering the parents a process through which
they can learn to function effectively as co-parents. 4 '
V. TOWARD NEW ROLES FOR PARENTS AND THE STATE
A. The Need for Reform
The foregoing sections of this article have argued there are shortcom-
ings with both parental and judicial decision making on custody matters.
40. See Section III(E) supra; Zimmerman v. 2immerman, 446 S.W.2d 503 (Mo.
App. 1969).
41. Standards for custody decisions, like abortion decisions, cannot be promulgated
effectively by legislatures. As Tribe points out, in the recent abortion decisions, the
Supreme Court rather than choosing between abortion and continued pregnancy was
"choosing among alternative allocations of decision-making authority" (Tribe, The Su-
preme Court, 1972 Term, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of
Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10-15 (1973)). The custody decision, like the abor-
tion decision, is best made by those who will have to live with it, and the way in which
they communicate the decision to the child may be more important to the child than
the wisdom of the decision. Furthermore, the process of adjudication is ill suited to the
resolution of custody disputes. Problems where the resolution of one issue has implica-
tions for the other issues, thus precluding the consideration of one issue in isolation, are
termed "polycentric" by Professor Fuller (Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law,
1960 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INTL L. 1, 3-5). Polycentric problems are better solved
through a process of negotiation and contract (Id. at 5; Henderson, Judicial Review of
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 CoL. L. REv.
1533, 1538 (1973)).
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The survey data discussed indicates that parents place primary import-
ance on the family structure factor and probably accord insufficient
weight to the social-emotional factor. The data also suggests that parents
too frequently assume that mothers generally should have custody. The
survey also demonstrates that parents receive very little advice and
counseling on custody issues from either attorneys or mental health
professionals.
Courts appear to make decisions on the same basic criteria as the
survey parents and thus make many of the same mistakes. For example,
courts, as well as parents, probably accord greater weight to the family
structure factor than to the social-emotional factor. Aside from the
substance of the decisions reached by courts, the process of deciding
custody issues by court trial can often be a combative, disruptive experi-
ence for children and parents alike.
Essentially what is needed is a non-combative custody decision-mak-
ing process that encourages parents to work out custody problems
creatively and to give primary attention to the social-emotional factor of
a child's welfare. The creation of a state sponsored mediation process
would be a logical method of offering such encouragement. Such an
approach would help protect the parents' basic right to guide the
upbringing of their children rather than turning important parts of pa-
rental decision making over to the courts.
B. Custody Mediation
At the outset it should be remembered that a mediator, unlike an
arbitrator, has no power to make a decision. His function is to facilitate
decision making by others.
The court custody mediation process should begin automatically whe-
never a petition for divorce is filed where the parties have minor
children. At the intial meeting the mediator should discuss with both of
the parties the various factors which should be considered in determing
"best interest," with prime stress on the social-emotional factor. If the
child involved is old enough to form an intelligent preference, the
mediator should request a conference with the child and should encour-
age the parents to give serious consideration to the child's feeilngs about
custody. The mediator should schedule at least one separate conference
with each parent. The purpose of these meetings would be to probe for
any feelings of information which the person might be reluctant to
disclose in front of the other party. At this stage the mediator can
reinforce constructive attitudes held by a party and can attempt to
deflate unreasonable positions.
After the initial conferences, the parties should be notified that they
have a short period of time, such as thirty days, in which to reach and
13
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file a custody agreement with the court. If they cannot reach an agree-
ment within that time, an intensive thirty-day mediation period should
follow. The need for rather stringent time limitations stems from the
child's need for as much certainty as possible in the uncertain and
frightening atmosphere created by the parents' separation. Furthermore,
the child's need for continuity of care necessitates that he initially be
placed with the parent who will assume permanent custody at the time
of the divorce.42 The statute establishing the custody mediator should
provide that in the event that one parent refuses to participate in the
mediation process, it will be presumed that it is in the child's best
interest to be placed in the custody of the other parent.
To avoid any tendency toward adversariness, the custody mediation
statute should specify that attorneys for the parties shall not be present
during mediation. The attorneys, of course, could advise their clients on
points of law at any time. The mediator would not attempt to give legal
advice to either party. Once the parties reach an agreement on custody,
their attorneys would be responsible for drafting the agreement and
submitting it to the court. The mediator could prepare a memorandum
of the agreement to aid the attorneys in their drafting. In order to litigate
the custody issue a plaintiff would have to allege mediation compliance
and exhaustion.
The mediation process is ideally suited to resolve custody conflicts. If
the parents are to function throughout the child's minority as co-parents,
it is necessary that they reach some basic agreement about the needs of
the child and how those needs can best be met.4" Several of the charac-
teristics of a collective bargaining situation which render it amenable to
mediation44 are also present in a custody dispute. First, the dispute is
between two parties. Second, the two parties are locked into an interde-
pendent relationship which exerts a strong pressure toward reaching an
agreement. Third, the parties are attempting to structure a situation in
which they can function effectively in the future.
Fuller stresses that the central quality of mediation is "its capacity to
reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them but
by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their
42. For an excellent discussion of "the child's sense-of-time" and the need for accel-
erated custody proceedings, see Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert J. Solnit, supra
note 12 at 40-9.
43. Fuller suggests that mediation is "directed toward bringing about a more har-
monious relationship between the parties, whether this be achieved through explicit
agreement, through a reciprocal acceptance of the 'social norms' relevant to their rela-
tionship, or simply because the parties have been helped to a new and more perceptive
understanding of one another's problems" (Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Func-
tions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305, 308 (1971)). He notes that the mediation process can
be helpful even in the termination of a business or marriage relationship.
44. Id. at 309-12.
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relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and disposi-
tions toward one another."45 Judicial custody decision-making does not
achieve such a reorientation of the parties, but rather further polarizes
their views and increases their animosity, rendering further disputes
between the parents likely.
The functions of a court custody mediator would be similar to those
of a labor mediator. He would facilitate the procedure by arranging
meetings between the parents, proposing the sequence of issues to be
discussed, creating deadlines for the parties, keeping channels of com-
munications open, and suggesting a variety of possible solutions.46
A major substantive function of the court custody mediator would be
to deflate the extreme position of the parties. This is something that can
best be accomplished by a totally impartial mediator through a series of
separate meetings with the parties. The mediator would also try to
ascertain the priorities of the parties, offer constructive suggestions to
the parties, and at least in some cases, would recommend a settlement.
An extremely important function of the court custody mediator would
be to assess the emotional and financial costs of a custody trial and
communicate these facts to the parties. 47
A unique function of the custody mediator would be that of educator.
Many parents have had little or no formal training in child psychology.
The mediator could furnish them with reading materials and discuss
with them the basic principles which should guide their decision.
As an observer of the parental custody decision process, the mediator
through compliments could reinforce desirable attitudes and efforts on
the part of the parties. The approval of an impartial observer could be
very helpful where one or both parents are feeling rejected and inade-
quate.
The professional qualifications of a custody mediator should include
either a masters degree in social work or a Ph.D. in psychology. A brief
training program should be conducted to acquaint the person with the
particular techniques of mediation. This program could be conducted by
any professional mediator.
The statute establishing the custody mediation process should state
that all parental communications with the mediator are privileged and
cannot be testified to in court. Nor can the mediator be called as a
witness in the custody litigation if the mediation process fails. The
mediator is not a decision maker, but a facilitator of parental decision
making.
45. Id. at 325.
46. See WILLIAM E. SImKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING, 77-98 (1971).
47. See id. at 99-106.
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Admittedly, compulsory mediation for all custody decisions would be
costly. Because most parents lack sufficient education concerning the
psychological needs of their children, mediation in every case would
serve a valuable function. At the very least it should be provided in cases
where parents cannot reach an early amicable decision.
It is possible that court custody mediators could make the process
more rational by teaching parents to construct decision trees. Such an
exercise might reduce the level of emotional tension and clarify areas of
disagreement. A detailed examination of the use of decision trees is
beyond the scope of this article. However, a brief description of the
process and an example of its use will be given.
Raiffa suggests a basic four-step method for the use of decision trees:
1) chart the possible consequences on a decision-flow diagram (decision
tree); 2) assign values to the different consequences; 3) assign proba-
bilities to each of the chance branches; and 4) determine the best
strategy after calculating the value of each branch.4 8
To demonstrate how this methodology could be applied to a custody
problem, assume a situation involving a male child fourteen years of
age. His mother has not worked and has spent significantly more time
with her son than has the father. The boy is close to both parents, but
says that he would rather live with his father. The mother will stay in
the family home and plans to take a part-time job to supplement the
alimony payments. The father is being transferred to another city 200
miles away. A decision tree constructed by one of the parents might
appear as in Figure 1.
The results from this decision tree indicate that the mother should
receive custody of the son. The other parent might reach a different
result if he or she perceived the facts differently or assigned different
values to the various factors. Reducing the decision-making process to
paper, however, would at least pinpoint the areas in which the parents
disagreed over facts or values and might open the door to compromise.
For example, in the hypothetical case, the parents might agree that the
son should remain with the mother for one year until he finishes junior
high school. Then if he still wants to live with the father, he would be
allowed to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION
A new process should be devised which will encourage parents to
accept the responsibility for making custody decisions. The adoption of
a court custody mediator system would best facilitate this objective.
48. H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS 129 (1968).
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FIG. 1 DECISION TREE, SHOWING FACORS IN A PARENTAL
CUSTODY DECISION
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In cases where the parents are unable to agree on custody, the child
would be protected from long periods of uncertainty about his future by
requiring mediation shortly after a suit for divorce is filed. The mediator
would educate the parents concerning the psychological needs of the
child, but the assignment of weights to various factors in the custody
decision would be left up to the parents. In the mediation process the
parents would, in effect, be negotiating a mutually acceptable definition
of the situation, including an assessment of the child's needs and of each
parent's ability to meet those needs. By helping the divorcing parties
learn to function effectively as co-parents, the state would maximize the
possibility of a wise initial custody decision. Divorced couples who have
learned to consider themselves co-parents for life would also be more
likely amicably to resolve future problems to custody, visitation and
education of the children without judicial intervention.
APPENDIX A-Description of the Survey Statistical Analyses
Eighteen chapters of Parents Without Partners, systematically selected
to cover different parts of the country including rural as well as metro-
politan areas, participated. Members filled out anonymous questionnaires
pertaining to how they settled custody. In all, 76 people responded, 48
females and 28 males. Of the 76 respondents, 57 were from families in
which the mother obtained custody of all the children, while 19 were from
families in which the father had custody of at least some children. The re-
ligious breakdown of the same was as follows: 24% Catholic, 50% Protes-
tant, 7% Jewish, 2% Buddhist, 17% who stated no religious preference.
The educational levels of the participants were as follows: 5% went no
further than 8th grade, another 41 % went no further than high school,
41% attended one to four years of college, and 12% went to graduate or
professional school. Fifty per cent of the respondents had been divorced
for three years or less. At the time that custody was decided, the average
age of the parents was 34, the age range was 21 -to 55. The average num-
ber of children in each family was 2.50. The average age of the children
was 8; the age range was prenatal to legal majority.
Forty-eight percent of the children were male. There was a tendency
(p.10) 49 for fathers to have custody of older children and of proportionately
more male children. Custody settlements occurred in twenty-one different
jurisdictions.
49. The statistical probability notation (p.10) indicates that the odds were greater
than 90% that fathers did indeed have custody of older children and of proportionately
more male children, and that the odds were less than 10% that there were no differences
in age and/or sex of children in the custody of their fathers or their mothers.
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Participating parents rated fifteen criteria shown in Table I on the fol-
lowing scale:
1 2 3 4 5
factor not unimportant moderately very crucial
applicable to important important (out weighs
my situation all other
factors)
A factor analysis of the fifteen custody criteria was carried out.50  The
factor matrix is shown in Table 2.
Hotelling's T2 analysis5' of the factor scores demonstrated that there were
significant differences in the extent to which each of these five factors was
considered crucial to deciding custody (F=18.25; df=4.72; p. .001). In
general, the family structure factor was regarded as the most important. For
mothers who obtained custody (multivariate F=3.39; df=4.53; p .001),
both family structure and maternal values were of primary importance; while
families in which the father obtained custody (multivariate F=3.39; df=4.15;
p .036) rated family structure and the child-oriented social-emotional factor
as the most important (See Table 3 for univariate F tests and Table 4 for
mean scores on each factor).
In an effort further to understand the divergence between fathers and
mothers, the data were inspected in more detail, looking at mean factor
scores for each of four groups of subjects: mothers who answered the
questionnaire who had custody, mothers who answered the questionnaire
where the father had custody, fathers who answered the questionnaire who
had custody, and fathers who answered the questionnaire where the mother
had custody (See Table 5).
With the maternal factor, it was most strongly believed that a mother
should have custody of young children in those cases in which the mother
did indeed obtain custody.
With the maternal factor, whether the father or the mother had custody
determined its importance; in other words, the notion that a mother should
have custody of young children was deemed most important in cases in
which the mother did indeed obtain custody.
The caretaking factor and the family structure factor presented another
picture: both were most highly rated by father respondents who also had
custody and second most highly rated by mother respondents who also had
50. According to Guertin and Bailey, "factor analysis is a formal decision making
process to explicate subsets of co-varying variables." (W. H. GUERTIN AND J.P. BAILEY,
INTRODUCTION TO MODERN FACTOR ANALYSIS 1 (1970). In other words, the question
being answered is: if a person feels that criterion #12 is important, what other criteria
is he apt to rate as important. Then, if a group of criteria are rated similarly by most
people, this group of criteria is called a factor. Factor analysis is a systematic mathe-
matical procedure for extracting factors from sets of ratings.
51. J.E. OVERALL AND C.J. KLETT, APPLIED MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, 310-13
(1972). A T statistic tests whether different scores are equal. The test is evaluated
using an F distribution to see whether there are systematic differences. A large F sug-
gests that a pattern of systematic differences may exist. The level of statistical signifi-
cance (p) of an F statistic is also dependent on the number of degrees of freedom (df),
which is determined from the number of variables and the number of subjects.
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custody. Respondents who did not obtain custody rated these two factors
much less highly. Further, fathers generally tended to rate caretaking
ability as more important than mothers rated it (p. 20).
Finally, the pattern for the child-oriented social-emotional factor was the
reverse of that above. Respondents who did not obtain custody rated this
factor higher than did respondents with custody. Fathers were slightly
higher than mothers.
In one other 'analysis, a discriminant function52 was calculated using the
fifteen individual items. Father and mother custody were found to be able
to be significantly discriminated using the combination of individual variables
shown in Table 6 (F=2.42; df=5.70; p .05).
TABLE 1
Criteria Which May be Considered in Deciding Who
Will Have Custody of Children
1. Young children should be with mother
2. Older child should be with parent of same sex
3. Child should be with parent who has closest relationship with him
4. Parent home during day
5. Parents' financial resources to care for child
6. Past or present serious mental illness of a parent
7. Parents' physiCla health
8. Alcoholism on part of a parent
9. Keeping child in same familiar custodial environment
10. Continuing child's religious -training
11. Parents' morals
12. Preference for two-parent home
13. Keeping children together
14. Preference of child
15. Permanence of family unit.
TABLE 2
Factors In Deciding Child Custodya
I II 11I IV V
CRITERIA Caretaker Child- Religious Family Maternal
Factor oriented Factor Structure Factor(parent's Social- Factor
ability to emotional
care for Factor
a child)
1. Young children
should be with
mother .06523 .03646 .09058 .02566 .94546
52. A discriminant function calculates a weighted combination of variables which
maximally distinguishes between the members of two groups. This weighted combina-
tion of variables yields a composite score which can later be used to classify additional
persons according to which group they are more likely to belong to. See Overall and
Klett, supra note 51 at 243-75.
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2. Older children
should be with
parent of the
same sex .10963 .80368 .16520 .16041 .00687
3. Child should be
with parent who
has closest re-
lationship with
him .16131 .65719 .00992 .28854 .17391
4. Parent home
during day .43180 .50246 .40337 -.11229 .16732
5. Parents financial
resources to care
for child .66790 .36367 .20553 .25120 .01854
6. Past or present
serious mental
illness of a
parent .92208 -.03677 .00553 .11502 .02235
7. Parents' physical
health .67536 .28446 .40353 -. 13369 .11206
8. Alcoholism on part
of a parent .51886
9. Keeping child in
same familiar cus-
todial environment .09113
10. Continuing child's
religious training .09920
11. Parent's morals .13120
12. Preference for two-
parent home .44498
13. Keeping children
together -.02650
14. Preference of
child -.07445
15. Permanence of
family unit .26041
-.06027
.16123
.23952
.13025
.43141
.06951
.62672
.54342
.13743
.82249
.80548
.59860
.12694
.36182
.20204
.78441
.24119
.15332
.09355
.82770
.18782
.04198
.09883
.11005
.01381
-.06863
-.01489
-.30435
.34986 .18513 .70049 -.12489
a. This matrix of factor loadings was obtained using principal components analysis
routine, with varimax rotation, from the FACTOR program in the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).
TABLE 3
UNIVARIATE F TESTS
Family Structure vs. Maternal
Family Structure vs. Child-Oriented
Social-Emotional
Maternal vs. Child-Oriented
Social-Emotional
Family Structure vs. Religious
All
(df= 1,75)
F= p<-
6.35 .014
34.45 .001
8.41 .005
34.86 .001
MOTHER
CUSTODY
(df= 1,56)
F= p6
1.39 .244
32.31 .001
15.76 .001
31.84 .001
FATHER
CUSTODY
(df=1,18)
F= pS
8.48 .009
4.38 .051
1.23 .281
5.96 .025
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Child-Oriented Social-Emotional
vs. Religious .08 .778 .04 .851 1.17 .293
Maternal vs. Religious 9.35 .008 10.94 .002 .02 .893
Religious vs. Caretaking Capacity 2.47 .120 2.19 .144 .31 .582
Maternal vs. Caretaking Capacity 107.93 .001 25.33 .001 .30 .592
Child-Oriented Social-Emotional vs.
Caretaking Capacity 3.68 .059 2.11 .152 1.54 .231
Family Structure vs. Caretaking Capacity 58.78 .001 43.50 .001 14.48 .001
TABLE 4
MEAN FACTOR SCORES a
A. all subjects (N=76)
Family Structure
Maternal
Child-Oriented Social-
Emotional
Religious
Caretaking Capacity
2.17
1.44
1.37
.98
B. mother obtained custody (N=57)
Family Structure 2.81
Maternal 2.47
Child-Oriented Social-Emotional 1.34
Religious 1.39
Caretaking Capacity .96
C. father obtained custody (N=19)
Family Structure 2.93
Child-Oriented Social-
Emotional 1.75
Religious 1.31
Maternal 1.27
Caretaking Capacity 1.03
a. Horizontal lines indicate which mean scores are significantly different.
TABLE 5
MOTHER VS. FATHER, RESPONDENT VS. CUSTODY
A. CARETAKING FACTOR
mean
Father Respondent/Father Custody 1.67
Mother Respondent/Mother Custody 1.11
Father Respondent/Mother Custody .62
Mother Respondent/Father Custody .15
Custody: father 1.03
mother .96
Respondent: father 1.03
mother .95
Fcust = .01 df = 1,72 n.s.
Fresp 1.74 df = 1,72 n.s.
F cust x resp = 6.52 df = 1,72 p<.05.
B. CHILD-ORIENTED SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL FACTOR
mean
Mother Respondent/Father Custody 2.58
Father Respondent/Mother Custody 1.71
Mother Respondent/Mother Custody 1.18
Father Respondent/Father Custody 1.14
st dev
1.60
1.55
1.04
1.27
1.63
1.43
1.36
1.54
st dev
1.47
1.25
1.37
1.16
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Custody: father 1.75 1.45 19
mother 1.34 1.35 57
Respondent: father 1.49 1.23 28
mother 1.41 1.47 48
F cust = 1.32 df 1,72 n.s.
F resp = 1.54 df = 1,72 n.s.
F cust x resp 7.34 df = 1,72 p<.01
C. FAMILY STRUCTURE FACTOR
mean st dev n=
Father Respondent/Father Custody 3.18 1.56 11
Mother Respondent/Mother Custody 3.07 1.49 40
Mother Respondent/Father Custody 2.58 2.21 8
Father Respondent/Mother Custody 2.21 1.54 17
Custody: father 2.93 1.83 19
mother 2.81 1.54 57
Respondent: father 2.59 1.59 28
mother 2.99 1.61 48
Fcust= .31 df= 1,72 n.s.
Fresp= .09 df= 1,72 n.s.
F cust x resp = 2.79 df = 1, 72 p<.10
D. MATERNAL FACTOR
mean st dev n=
Mother Respondent/Mother Custody 2.68 1.71 40
Father Respondent/Mother Custody 1.99 1.70 17
Mother Respondent/Father Custody 1.31 1.25 8
Father Respondent/Father Custody 1.24 1.15 11
Custody: father 1.27 1.16 19
mother 2.47 1.72 57
Respondent: father 1.69 1.53 28
mother 2.45 1.71 48
Fcust= 5.82 df= 1, 72 p<.05
Fresp= .76 df= 1,72 n.s.
F custxresp = .49 df = 1,72 n.s.
TABLE 6
MOTHER VS. FATHER CUSTODY DISCRJMINANT
FUNCTION
Variable Mother Father
1. Young children should be with mother .977 .475
2. Older child should be with parent
of same sex .706 1.126
10. Continuing child's religious training -.108 .260
11. Parents' morals .625 .402
4. Parent at home during the day .350 .141
Constant -3.653 -3.084
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